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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RONALD K. KINCHION
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION ACTION
v. No. 12-1203-MLB
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, and 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, )
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 70, and )
LOCAL LODGE NO. 774, )
)
Defendant. ) *1
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the court are the following:
1. Defendant Cessna's Motion for Partial Dismissal of the
Amended Complaint (Docs. 33, 34); Plaintiff's Response
(Doc. 38); and Cessna's Reply (Doc. 41);
2. Defendant Int'l. Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers Dist. Lodge 70 and Local No. 774 (hereinafter 
"union") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35); and Plaintiff's 
Response (Doc. 39); [No Reply filed] and
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Sur-reply (Doc.
23) ; Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Defendants'
Motions (Doc. 40).
Background
Plaintiff Ronald Kinchion worked approximately 15 years at 
Cessna as a small-parts finish painter. He had a number of health 
problems over that time that required medical treatment and leave. In 
2011, Cessna disciplined plaintiff several times for alleged poor work 
performance. Plaintiff disputed the allegations and initiated 
grievances under the machinist union's collective bargaining agreement 
with Cessna. Cessna terminated plaintiff's employment on January 11,
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2012.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action against Cessna and the 
union. His amended complaint asserts the following claims: Count 1 - 
unlawful retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim; Count 
2 - breach of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"); Count 3 - 
breach of the union's duty of fair representation; Count 4 - 
interference with rights under the Family Medical Leave Act; Count 5 - 
breach of a 2008 settlement agreement between plaintiff and Cessna; 
and Count 6 - termination in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.
Both defendants now move for partial dismissal of the claims in 
the amended complaint.1 Cessna contends Counts 2 and 3 relating to the 
CBA should be dismissed because plaintiff fails to plausibly allege 
that the union acted in bad faith and because plaintiff has not 
exhausted the CBA grievance process. The union joins in these 
arguments as to Count 3, the only count against it. Cessna also 
contends Count 5 should be dismissed because it is essentially the 
same as Count 1. Count 5 is based on Cessna's alleged breach of a 2008 
settlement agreement in which Cessna promised to "comply with Kansas 
law." Plaintiff contends Cessna breached that agreement by engaging 
in the unlawful retaliation identified in Count 1. Cessna argues Count 
5 is "entirely derivative" of Count 1 and is "duplicative and 
unnecessary." Finally, as to the ADA claim in Count 6, Cessna contends 1
1 Cessna filed a motion to dismiss Counts 2,3 and 5 of the 
original complaint. (Doc. 13). After that motion was fully briefed, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 28), with the only change 
in the complaint being the addition of Count 6. Cessna then filed a 
second motion to dismiss (Doc. 33) which incorporated the same 
arguments previously made and added a request to dismiss Count 6.
- 2 -
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plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show he was 
disabled or was regarded by Cessna as having a disability.
Motion to dismiss - Rule 12(b)(6) standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading 
stating a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." But "dismissal 
is appropriate where 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 679. Mere labels and conclusions or the formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. The factual 
allegations of the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Facts.
The following allegations from plaintiff's amended complaint are 
taken as true for purposes of defendants' motion to dismiss the 
claims.
Cessna is an aircraft manufacturing company with operations in 
Wichita, Kansas. Plaintiff was an employee of Cessna until his
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termination on January 11, 2012. Their employment relationship was
subject to a collective bargaining agreement between Cessna and the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 
District Lodge No. 70 and Local Lodge No. 774.
Plaintiff began employment with Cessna as a small-parts finish 
painter in 1997. His job involved frequent, repetitive use of his 
hands. From 2004-2006, plaintiff was treated for an on-the-job injury 
under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The injury involved a cyst 
on his right wrist, carpel tunnel syndrome affecting his right wrist, 
thumb and two fingers, and tendinitis in his right shoulder. In 2007, 
plaintiff sued Cessna, claiming disability discrimination, workers 
compensation retaliatory discharge, and Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) interference. That suit was dismissed when the parties entered 
into "the 2008 Agreement," pursuant to which Cessna promised to 
"comply with Kansas law in all aspects of Kinchion's continued 
employment with Cessna."
In late 2008, Cessna approved plaintiff's FMLA intermittent 
leave request for a one-year period, approving leave of one time per 
month with a duration of 1-2 days per episode. This was granted after 
plaintiff submitted a doctor's certification that he suffered from 
conditions including diabetes mellitus type 2, cardiac dysrhythmia, 
mitral valve prolapse, irritable bowel syndrome, and diabetic 
neuropathy. Cessna thereafter approved plaintiff's FMLA annual leave 
renewals. On February 1, 2011, Cessna approved plaintiff's FMLA leave 
request for the year 2011, granting leave with a frequency of 2-3 
times per month with a duration of 1-3 days per episode.
On February 11, 2011, plaintiff filed a new on-the-job injury
- 4 -
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claim for a new cyst on his right wrist and pain in the right trigger 
finger. A doctor confirmed this diagnosis, imposed work restrictions, 
and offered two options: cortisone injections or surgery. Plaintiff's 
supervisor at the time assigned him duties other than spray painting.
In July 2011, a nurse with Cessna Health Services "instructed 
[plaintiff] to paint with his left hand," which plaintiff apparently 
began doing after his doctor "capitulated to Cessna" and told 
plaintiff to do as Cessna instructed. Plaintiff subsequently began 
having problems with his left hand, thumb and fingers.
In August 2011, Crystal Simmons was assigned as plaintiff's 
supervisor and "immediately ... began finding fault with Plaintiff's 
work quality."
On August 18, 2011, plaintiff was appointed as a machinist union 
Shop Steward.
On August 22, 2011, Simmons gave plaintiff a written reprimand 
for poor work performance (paint quality). Plaintiff filed a grievance 
the next day, August 23, 2011.
Plaintiff had various medical restrictions in August and 
September 2011. On September 29, 2011, plaintiff underwent surgery on 
his right hand.
On September 30, 2011, Steve Elder, the second shift Plant 
Chair, agreed with Cessna to settle plaintiff's August 23, 2011 
grievance. It was agreed that the reprimand would remain on 
plaintiff's record for two months and plaintiff's supervisor would 
arrange for plaintiff to receive additional training. Plaintiff 
alleges that this agreement was made without his knowledge and without 
consulting him.
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Plaintiff returned to work on October 3, 2011 with the following 
restrictions: No painting with right hand; no lifting over 5# with 
right hand; no painting over 2.5 hours with left hand; and no lifting 
over 15# with left hand.
On October 6, 2011, Simmons assigned plaintiff to the priming 
booth and told him to spray paint with his left hand. Simmons 
contacted Michelle Rink, an RN in Cessna Health Services (CHS), who 
in turn contacted fellow CHS employee Penny Gilbert. Gilbert told 
plaintiff that she had just spoken with plaintiff's doctor and he had 
approved plaintiff painting with his right hand at 4-hour intervals. 
Plaintiff's wife contacted the doctor, who said he had not spoken to 
anyone about the matter.
On October 7, 2011, Simmons gave plaintiff a written warning 
regarding the paint quality of the work he had performed the previous 
day. Plaintiff filed a grievance over the warning on October 7, 2011. 
Simmons again assigned plaintiff to work in the priming booth.
On October 10, 2011, plaintiff filed a grievance against Simmons 
claiming that she made a promotion to crew chief in violation of the 
CBA terms. Plaintiff claimed that Simmons promoted a female over three 
males (including plaintiff) with more seniority who had expressed 
interest in the job and who had not been given the same crew chief 
training opportunities that Simmons had arranged for the female 
candidate.
On October 12, 2011, Simmons and the Cessna Human Resources 
Director suspended plaintiff for three days for work quality he had 
performed on October 7, 2011, claiming there were blisters and drips 
on the parts he painted. On October 12, 2011, plaintiff filed a
- 6 -
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grievance over the suspension. Plaintiff contends that he and no one 
else had been required to paint in violation of his medical 
restrictions; that he and no one else had been required to paint with 
their non-dominant hand; and that he was singled out for discipline 
for paint defects, which he contends are common occurrences that are 
usually simply sanded and repainted.
Plaintiff returned to work on October 17, 2011. On October 26, 
2011, Penny Gilbert of CHS was informed by a doctor that the hands are 
a target for several diabetes-related complications. These may include 
"trigger finger" and carpal tunnel syndrome.
From October 28, 2011 to November 28, 2011, plaintiff took an 
approved unpaid medical leave of absence.
On December 12, 2011, plaintiff "flame coated" some electrical 
junction boxes. He did one side and left the parts to cure, as was 
customary. Two days later another painter did the other side and left 
the parts to cure. Simmons and the new crew chief took the parts to 
a supervisor, who rejected them without knowing that the parts were 
not yet finished because they had not been kiln-baked. Simmons and 
others called plaintiff in on December 14, 2011, to write him up for 
the flame-coat parts. Plaintiff informed them he was not the only 
person to paint the parts. The next day, Simmons gave plaintiff notice 
of an investigation. On December 16, 2011, Simmons, plaintiff, Elder 
and others met for the investigation. It was determined that another 
painter had painted one side of the parts and they were unfinished 
because they had not yet been kiln-baked. These facts, according to 
the complaint, meant that "no discipline could be imposed on 
Plaintiff."
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On December 21, 2011, Simmons suspended plaintiff indefinitely 
without pay for poor work quality, verbally alleging that plaintiff 
had improperly painted parts on December 20, 2011. On January 11, 
2012, Cessna terminated plaintiff's employment due to the December 
21st suspension. On January 13, 2012, plaintiff filed a grievance 
concerning his termination.
Plaintiff alleges that Steve Elder, the union Plaint Chair, made 
various comments to him during January and February 2012 about the 
status of his grievances, most of which he said were at "Step 2" of 
the process. On February 27, 2012, Elder informed plaintiff that 
Cessna had denied his grievance and he said he was sending it to Step 
3.
Under the CBA, Cessna and the union agreed to settle all 
grievances under a four-step process, ranging from informal verbal 
discussion to a written complaint with investigation, hearing and 
replies. If a grievance remained unsettled after Step 4, it could be 
appealed to arbitration by either the company or the union. The CBA 
provides that the decision of the arbitrator "shall be final and 
binding upon the Company, the Union and the grievant(s) involved."2
On March 9, 2012, plaintiff was informed that Becky Ledbetter, 
a union Business Representative, still had not received the grievance 
files from Elder. Later in March of 2012, plaintiff was told by
2 Although the CBA was not attached to the complaint, it is 
referred to by plaintiff and is central to his claims. Additionally, 
he does not challenge the accuracy of the CBA provisions cited by 
Cessna. The court therefore can consider the CBA without converting 
this to a summary judgment motion. GFF Corp. v. Wholesale Grocers, 
Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997); Munno v. Town of Orange, 
391 F.Supp.2d 263, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (CBA was central to plaintiff's 
claims).
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Ledbetter that she would be talking to Cessna's Human Resources and 
that "they would be getting this all taken care of." In early April 
Ledbetter told plaintiff that Cessna was still investigating the 
situation. Later in April, Ledbetter told him Cessna was now talking 
about plaintiff's attendance, claiming he had been given 13 verbal 
warnings regarding attendance. Plaintiff informed Ledbetter this was 
not true, pointing out that he had been on approved FMLA leave and had 
missed work due to an on-the-job injury for which he received an 
approved medical leave of absence under the union contract. Ledbetter 
told plaintiff "to be patient" as she addressed the allegations.
The grievance provisions of the CBA contain various time 
limitations. Plaintiff's allegations suggest that his grievances may 
not have been processed within the time limits, although the 
grievances are apparently still pending.3 The CBA allows the parties 
to mutually agree in writing upon extensions of time in the grievance 
process. The pleadings are silent on whether the parties mutually 
agreed to extend the CBA time limits.
On May 3, 2012, plaintiff's doctor released him to return to
work with lifting restrictions that were within the essential task 
range for his position.
Plaintiff alleges that Cessna suspended and terminated him in 
violation of the CBA and that it failed to comply with the CBA
3 Cessna asserted in a reply brief that "since the filing of the 
instant lawsuit the Union and Cessna have entered into Step 4 of the 
grievance process" and plaintiff thus "still has an opportunity to 
bring his grievances before an arbitrator." (Doc. 22 at 4, n.4).
Plaintiff misconstrues this as asserting that the matter was submitted 
to arbitration and says "Plaintiff has not been so informed," although 
counsel for the union allegedly told plaintiff "that arbitration was 
going to be filed 'soon.'" (Doc. 23-1 at 1, n.1)
- 9 -
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procedures for discipline and grievances. He alleges that the union 
breached its duty to fairly represent him by failing to properly 
pursue the foregoing grievances.
Counts 2 & 3 - Breach of CBA; Breach of Duty of Fair Representation
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) gives 
federal district courts jurisdiction to hear claims for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor union. 
29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiff relies on this provision in suing both 
Cessna for violation of the CBA (Count 2) and the machinist's union 
for violation of the duty of fair representation (Count 3). Each of 
these counts is considered a "hybrid" claim that requires the 
plaintiff to prove the same three elements: (1) conduct by the union 
that violated its duty of fair representation; (2) a causal connection 
showing that the union's breach affected the integrity of the 
arbitration/grievance process; and (3) a violation of the CBA by the 
employer. Webb v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th 
Cir. 1998). See DelCostello v. Int'l. Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151, 163-64 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
The requirement that a plaintiff must prove the union's breach 
of duty in order to sue the employer is related to the CBA's grievance 
provisions. Because most CBAs (including this one) require exhaustion 
of the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures, an employee 
ordinarily has to exhaust such remedies before bringing suit.4 See
4 Courts also have discretion to require exhaustion of internal 
union appeal procedures when those procedures can result in complete 
relief to the employee or reactivation of a grievance without undue 
delay to the employee's opportunity for a judicial hearing. Clayton
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Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) ("Congress 
has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred 
method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of the 
plant."); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562-63 
(1976) ("Courts are not to usurp those functions which collective­
bargaining contracts have property 'entrusted to the arbitration 
tribunal.'").
But the exhaustion requirement is excused in some circumstances, 
including when the union has prevented the employee from utilizing the 
grievance process by breaching its duty of fair representation. Garvin 
v. American Tel. & Telegraph Co., 174 F.3d 1087, 1093 (10th Cir. 
1999). Plaintiff alleges that he is excused from the exhaustion 
requirement because the union breached its duty to him by "failing to 
properly pursue" his grievances.
The union's duty of fair representation arises from its 
statutory position as exclusive bargaining representative of the 
employee. The duty renders the union liable for conduct that is 
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Schwartz v. Broth. of 
Maint. Of Way Employees, 264 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(citations omitted) . Plaintiff relies on the first component - 
arbitrary conduct - which occurs when a union's "behavior is so far 
outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." Schwartz, 
264 F.3d at 1185.
The "perfunctory" handling of a meritorious grievance can rise
v. Int'l. Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr. Impl. Workers of 
Am. , 451 U.S. 679 (1981). None of the parties claim that plaintiff
should have invoked such procedures in the instant case.
- 11 -
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to the level of arbitrary conduct. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 ("we accept 
the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious 
grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion"). This occurs if the 
union acts "without concern or solicitude" or gives a claim only 
"cursory attention," instead of making a prompt and diligent effort 
to get a grievance heard. Webb, 155 F.3d at 1240. For example, in Webb 
the union hurt the plaintiff's reinstatement chances by failing to 
file a grievance it believed to be meritorious, failing to follow its 
regular grievance practice, misleading the plaintiff by telling him 
that his presence at the hearing was not needed and then misleading 
the grievance panel as to why plaintiff was absent, and disparaging 
plaintiff in front of the grievance panel and contradicting his 
account of events. Webb, 155 F.3d at 1240, n.14. See also Walker v. 
Consol. Freightways, Inc., 930 F.2d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 1991) 
("Malicious or egregious delay in pursuing plaintiff's rights can 
violate the Vaca proscription."); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 
F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (6th Cir. 1981) (union's conduct is arbitrary when, 
without justification or excuse, it makes no decision as to the merits 
of an individual’s grievance and merely allows it to expire). But a 
plaintiff claiming breach of the union's duty must demonstrate that 
the union's actions constitute more than "mere errors in judgment" or 
"mere negligence." Hinkley v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 249 Fed.Appx. 13, 
17, 2007 WL 2709936 (10th Cir. 2007) [citations omitted].
Any substantive examination of a union's performance must also 
be "highly deferential," recognizing the wide latitude the union needs 
in dealing with its members and performing its role. See Air Line 
Pilots Ass'n., Int'l. v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). Moreover,
- 12 -
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an employee does not possess any absolute right to have a grievance 
taken to arbitration, and a union does not breach its duty merely 
because it decides to settle a grievance short of arbitration. Vaca, 
386 U.S. at 190-91.
Plaintiff's claim appears to be based entirely on what he 
characterizes (in a sur-reply brief) as "a flagrant disregard of the 
grievance procedure time limits set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement." Doc. 23-1 at 5. But the Amended Complaint lacks a 
sufficient factual basis for such a conclusion. It is true the CBA 
contains fairly narrow time limits and a "time is of the essence" 
provision stating that a grievance "will automatically be decided 
against the party who fails to comply with such limits,..." (Doc. 14-1 
at p.38). But there is an exception when "an extension of time limits 
is mutually agreed upon in writing by the parties." The complaint does 
not address whether any extensions of time were agreed upon by the 
parties. Nor does it set forth any facts about the normal course of 
grievances or common delays in the process, such as delays caused by 
a need for further investigation.
In addition to an absence of key facts, several allegations in 
the amended complaint tend to refute the claim that the union treated 
plaintiff's grievances in a perfunctory manner. The allegations show 
that between January and April of 2012, union representatives 
expressed a continuing intent to pursue plaintiff's grievances, they 
took various steps to further the grievance process, and they 
communicated with plaintiff about the status of the grievances. 
Plaintiff's factual allegations essentially stop in April of 2012 when 
the union representative told plaintiff "to be patient" as she dealt
- 13 -
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with Human Resources over Cessna's new claim of unexcused absences. 
Neither the original complaint filed in June of 2012 nor the amended 
complaint filed in August of 2012 discuss the status of the grievances 
or the union's conduct (or lack thereof) after April of 2012. The 
complaint indicates that some of the delay complained of was caused 
by Cessna's need for investigation, a delay to which the union 
apparently acceded. (See Doc. 28, 5582-85).
Cessna represents that plaintiff's grievance was moved to Step 
4 by early August 2012 and that plaintiff "will soon be able to bring 
his claim in arbitration." (Doc. 22 at 4). The union has likewise 
asserted that the grievances "have not been closed and are still in 
progress." (Doc. 36 at 1). The complaint is silent on these matters. 
Clearly, plaintiff's grievances have been delayed, but there are no 
allegations that either party to the CBA has claimed a violation of 
the agreement's time limits. Significantly, there are also no facts 
alleging that the claimed breach of duty by the union has in any way 
affected the integrity of the grievance process or precluded 
plaintiff's grievances. Cf. Webb, 155 F.3d at 1229 (elements of claim 
include showing that the breach affected the integrity of the 
grievance process); Clayton v. Int'l. Union, United Auto., Aerospace, 
and Agr. Impl. Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679, 691, n.18 (1981) 
(parties' stipulation that grievance could not be revived was 
consistent with the time limitations of CBA).
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege sufficient facts 
"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Twombly, 
500 U.S. at 555. Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
- 14 -
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has alleged — but it has not "shown" — that the pleader is entitled 
to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. That is the case here. Plaintiff's 
facts raise the possibility that the union has failed to process the 
grievances in accordance with the CBA time limits. But the amended 
complaint leaves out material allegations, including the status of the 
grievances as of the filing of the amendment, the union's conduct 
after April 2012, and the cause or asserted reason for any delays. The 
mere fact of a delay, standing alone, does not show the union breached 
its duty to fairly represent plaintiff. See e.g., Balderas v. Cessna 
Aircraft Corp., 2003 WL 1342942, *6 (D. Kan., Mar. 12, 2003) ("[t]he 
fact that arbitration was delayed does not, on its own, justify 
finding a breach of the duty of fair representation"); Dobrski v. Ford 
Motor Co., 698 F.Supp.2d 966, 991 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (without additional 
information, alleging that a union did not sufficiently pursue a 
grievance is "legally insufficient to support a claim for breach of 
the duty of fair representation"); Smith v. United Steel Workers of 
Am. , 2007 WL 2477345, *10 (S.D. W.Va., Aug. 29, 2007) ("While not
ideal, the six and a half month period between step three and step 
four ... [does] not rise to the level of wholly irrational, 
perfunctory, or otherwise arbitrary conduct necessary for a successful 
breach of the duty of fair representation claim."); Mathis v. CWA 
Local Union 4320, 2011 WL 3497189, *5 (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 9, 2011)
(allegations that union took no action on grievance for three months 
and that delay was unwarranted failed to state claim for breach of 
duty).
The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff has failed to 
allege sufficient facts to show the union has breached its duty of
- 15 -
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fair representation. As such, plaintiff's failure to exhaust the 
grievance/arbitration process is not excused. Counts 2 and 3 will be 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust the contractual 
remedies of the CBA.
Count 5 - Breach of Contract
Cessna argues Count 5 should be dismissed because it is entirely 
"duplicative" of Count 1. Count 5 alleges a breach of the parties' 
2008 Settlement Agreement, in which Cessna promised to comply with 
Kansas law in all aspects of plaintiff's continued employment. Count 
5 alleges that Cessna breached that promise by violating plaintiff's 
rights under the Kansas workers compensation laws. Count 1 separately 
seeks to recover under Kansas tort law for the same violations of 
workers compensation rights.
Defendant is correct insofar as it suggests plaintiff will not 
be able to obtain duplicate recovery for the same injury by asserting 
different legal theories. See Aguilar v. Balano, 241 P.3d 601 (Table), 
2010 WL 4668333, *4 (Kan.App. 2010) (double recovery not permitted for 
the same injury based on two theories). And it would make little sense 
to submit both claims to a jury, given that to prevail on Count 5 
plaintiff would have to prove all the elements of Count 1 plus an 
agreement not to violate the workers compensation laws. See Hamdy v. 
County of Niagara, 2007 WL 295325 (W.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2007) ("It would 
be cumulative, a waste of time and too confusing to submit essentially 
the same claim to the jury based upon two different theories.") But 
Cessna has not shown that recovery under a breach of contract theory 
is precluded as a matter of law or that dismissal of the claim is
- 16 -
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necessarily required.5 The motion to dismiss Count 5 will therefore be 
denied. Cf. Dobyns v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 412, 421 (Fed.Cl. 
2010) (settlement agreement by design afforded plaintiff a contractual 
remedy should ATF, in the future, not comply with all laws regarding 
or affecting his employment). But see McGee v. Dist. of Columbia, 646 
F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Courts typically dismiss contract 
claims that duplicate contemporaneously-filed discrimination or 
retaliation claims.").
Count 6 - ADA claim
Count 6 of the amended complaint alleges that plaintiff was 
terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
The complaint's allegations relating to this claim more or less 
consist of the statutory language. Cessna contends plaintiff has not 
plausibly alleged enough facts to show that he has a disability or 
that Cessna regarded him as having a disability.
The ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, prohibits covered employers 
from discriminating against qualified employees on the basis of a 
disability. § 12112(a). "Disability" means, with respect to an 
individual: (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (b) a 
record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded has having such an 
impairment. § 12102(1)(A).
5 Unlike Foodbrands Supply Chain Servs., Inc. v. Terracon Inc., 
2003 WL 23484633, *6 (D. Kan. 2003), these two claims are not based 
entirely on the same set of facts. The terms of the 2008 Settlement 
Agreement show that it was designed to supplement or reinforce 
plaintiff's existing rights under Kansas law by offering a contractual 
guarantee.
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The ADA (as amended in 2008) 6 provides that a "major life 
activity" includes not only such things such as breathing, walking, 
talking and working, but also the operation of a major bodily 
function, including the immune, digestive, respiratory, endocrine, 
musculoskeletal and other systems. The term "substantially limits" is 
not meant to be a demanding standard. See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j). An 
impairment qualifies as a disability if it substantially limits the 
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared 
to most people in the general population, even if it does not 
significantly or severely restrict the individual from performing the 
activity. The determination is ordinarily to be made without regard 
to ameliorative measures, including medication. An impairment that is 
episodic is considered a disability if it would substantially limit 
a major life activity when active. §1630(j).
As Cessna points out, plaintiff basically concedes the amended 
complaint does not identify any major life activity or major bodily 
function that is substantially limited by an impairment. (Doc. 38 at 
9) . He argues such facts are unnecessary because the complaint 
elsewhere mentioned that he was diagnosed with diabetes. Plaintiff 
says the regulations identify diabetes and its effect on endocrine 
function as the type of impairment that "will, in virtually all cases, 
result in coverage under the ADAAA." (Doc. 38 at 9). He makes a 
similar argument with respect to other diagnosed conditions mentioned
6 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was passed "with the explicit 
purpose of rejecting certain standards and reasoning of Supreme Court 
opinions regarding interpretation of the ADA and 'reinstating a broad 
scope of protection to be available under the ADA . ' " Allen v. 
SouthCrest Hosp., 455 Fed.Appx. 827, 834, 2011 WL 6394472 (10th Cir. 
2011).
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in the complaint.
The regulations do provide that certain impairments, including 
diabetes, will "in virtually all cases" result in a finding of a 
disability, making the necessary individualized assessment 
"particularly simple and straightforward." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(3). If 
plaintiff is relying on such an impairment and its substantial 
limitation on his endocrine function, he merely has to allege as much 
in the complaint. But the defendant should not have to guess at the 
basis for the claim of disability discrimination. Kansas Penn Gaming, 
LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011) (Twombly pleading 
standard ensures that a defendant is placed on notice of his alleged 
misconduct).
Parroting the statutory language without any supporting facts 
[Doc. 28 at 114-117] is exactly what the Supreme Court had in mind 
when it said the complaint must do more than give "a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555. Detailed facts are not required, but a valid claim must 
contain a showing of an entitlement to relief. Plaintiff's unexplained 
allegations that he has an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity, or a record of such an impairment, fail to meet 
this standard. Sprague v. Kasa Indus. Controls, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 630, 
633 (D.Kan. 2008) (plaintiff alleged that as a result of a back injury 
she "has an impairment which substantially limits one or more major 
life activities, a record of such an impairment, and plaintiff was 
regarded by defendant as having such an impairment. This is no more 
than a formulaic recitation of the definition of disability under the 
ADA that the Twombly court stated 'will not do.'"); Mora v. University
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of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, 469 Fed.Appx. 295, 297-298, 2012 
WL 745101, 2 (5th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff did not specify which of her 
life activities is substantially limited; "[t]his is fatal to stating 
a valid claim for relief.").
Plaintiff's additional "regarded as" disabled claim does not 
necessarily require him to allege or show that he has an impairment 
or that it limits a major life activity. But it does require a showing 
that Cessna subjected him to a prohibited action "because of an actual 
or perceived impairment that is not both 'transitory and minor.'" 29 
C.F.R. §1630.2(g)(1)(iii). Plaintiff's "regarded as" allegations, 
which also merely repeat the statutory language, do not adequately 
state the factual basis for this claim. Smith v. Regional Plan Ass’n, 
Inc., 2011 WL 4801522, 5-6 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2011) (merely alleging 
that plaintiff's employer "perceived Plaintiff as a disabled person" 
not sufficient under Twombly).
Plaintiff has requested leave to amend the complaint if the 
court finds his ADA allegations insufficient. (Doc. 38 at 12). 
Because plaintiff's brief shows that the inadequacies in Count 6 could 
be cured, the court will grant his request for leave to amend the 
complaint.7
7 In light of the showing made by plaintiff in his brief, the 
absence of unfair surprise to the defendants, and the preference for 
resolution of claims on the merits, the court will consider 
plaintiff's request as a motion for leave to amend and will excuse 
plaintiff's failure to comply with D. Kan. R. 15.1. Cf. Calderon v. 
Kansas Dept. of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th
Cir. 1999).
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Conclusion
Cessna's and the International Association of Machinists' 
Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 13, 33, and 35) are GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Counts 2 and 3 of the Amended Complaint are dismissed 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. The 
motions to dismiss are denied as to Count 5.
Cessna's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 
granted as to Count 6 of the Amended Complaint, but plaintiff is 
granted 14 days from the filing of this order to file an amended 
complaint curing the pleading deficiencies in Count 6.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to file Surreply (Doc. 23) is 
granted. The court has considered the surreply in this ruling.
Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate (Doc. 40) is denied as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3rd day of January 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/Monti Belot________________
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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